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STATE CONTROL OF PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM
Recent decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States
and in the Supreme Court of Tennessee have brought again to
the foreground of public thought the problem of a state's power
to control the education of the children. The discussion of that
power is limited in this paper to the public schools, not because
the private school curriculum is of less importance to the state,
but because it seems that legislative exercise of that control in
the immediate future will b.e directed to the public school curri-
culum only.
1. A BRoA&D AND COMPREIRENSIVE PowER.
The power of the state to prescribe subjects and text books
for the public schools is unquestioned. That power must reside
somewhere, unless the public schools are to be left as neglected
children to grow as they please and to do what they please. The
power of control might have been vested in local communities,
in counties or in the state, but without exception that control is
primarily vested in the state legislature. "Essentially and in-
trinsically-the schools in which are educated and trained the
children who are to become the rulers of the commonwealth are
matters of state and not of local jurisdiction. In such matters
the state is a unit and the Legislature the source of power." 1
The customary method by which state legislature have exer.
cised this control is by delegating authority in generous terms
to local boards, city, county or district. No constitutional objec-
tion can be successfully urged against this delegation,2 nor can
1 State of Indiana, cx rel. Clark v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N. E.
946, 7 L. R. A. 240 (1890). See also Roach v. St. Louis Public Schools,
77 Mo. 484 (1883); Associated Schools v. School District No. 83, 122
Minn. 254, 142 N. W. 325, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 200 (1913); Fenton v.
Board of Cimmissioners, 20 Idaho 392, 119 Pac. 41 (1911); State v.
Hine, 59 Conn. 50, 21 At. 1024, 10 L. R. A. 83 (1890).2Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 256 (1854); Board
of Public Education v. Barlow, 49 Ga. 232 (1873); Ratcliiff v. Paris, 6
Neb. 539 (1877).
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it be claimed that the legislature is thereafter precluded from
resuming the direct control of the school system or from adding
to or otherwise changing the curriculum or the books. "As
the power over schools is a legislative one, it is not exhausted
by exercise. The legislature, having tried one plan, is not pre-
cluded from trying another. It has a choice of methods and
may change its plans as often as it deems it necessary or expe-
dient. "3
Where the control of the public schools has been vested in a
local body, such as a city board of school commissioners, that
body has the same general authority over the schools that the
legislature has, but it must exercise that authority consistently
with the laws of the state. For example, a state statute may
provide for the teaching of a designated foreign language pro.
vided the parents of twenty-five or more children in the city
shall so demand. This statute imposes a duty upon the city
school board, regardless of the board's opinion as to the wisdom
or expediency of the language course. In School Commission-
ers of Indianapolis v. State, ex rel., Sander 4 the court said:
"With reference to the act under consideration, we are of the
opinion that where the requisite demand is made, it becomes the
duty of the Board of School Commissioners to introduce the
German language as a study into the particular school where it
is demanded. . . They have no discretion to refuse but
must act."
Similarly, when the legislature, instead of acting directly
gives to a state board of education the power to prescribe the
course which is to be carried out by the local boards of educa-
tion, such local boards must adopt the course prescribed by the
state board,5 and are as fully controlled by the action of the state
board acting under such statutory authoriky as they would be
by an express legislative prescription of the course. The author-
ity of state boards has been frequently upheld in litigation con-
cerning text books. When the legislature has placed in the
hands of the state board of education or of a special commission,
the authority to select text books, the selection is as binding on
B tate of Indiana, ex rel Clark v. Haworth, supra.
4129 Ind. 14, 28 N. E. 61, 13 L. R. A. 147 (1891).
5 Wagner v. Royal, 36 Wash. 428, 78 Pac. 1094 (1904); Westland
Pub. Co. v. Royal, 36 Wash. 399, 78 Pac. 1096 (1904).
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the teachers and pupils as if the legislature by statutory enact-
ment had specifically named the books.8
The power to prescribe courses of study is frequently de-
legated in whole or in part to the local board of education, and
the question is then presented whether the local board is limited
to the subjects named in the state statute. This power to pre-
scribe the course of study is broadly construed and is measured
by the discretion and sound judgment of the board. Constitu-
tional and statutory prohibitions must be obeyed, but the mere
fact that a school district board provides that other branches
'besides those specifically enumerated in the statute shall be
taught does not mean that the provision of the additional sub-
ject is unauthorized.
Among the subjects Which may be prescribed, although not
specifically mentioned in the statute, and not falling within the
usual scope of common school education may be mentioned book-
keeping,7 debates and composition, s kindergarten, 9 manual train-
ing,' 0 foreign languages1 and music. 12 The legislature itself
may add to a curriculum already established, as by requiring
-courses in agriculture and home economics.
13
We have thus far seen no limitation on the power of the
state to prescribe thie course of study in the public schools. The
power is full and comprehensive. But the question may be
raised whether this control has been in any way weakened by
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which
declared unconstitutional two measures that were largely sup-
0Keeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S. W. 962, 48 L. R. A. 167 (1899) ;
McGormick v. Burt, 95 Ili. 263, 35 Am. Rep. 163 (1880); Donahoe v.
Richards, 38 Me. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 256 (1854); Rand McNally & Co. v.
Royal, 36 Wash. 420, 78 Pac. 1103 (1904).
7 Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567 (1875).
8 Samuel Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford, 111 Ga. 801, 36 S.
E. 920 (1900).
9Sinnott v. Colombet, 107 Cal. 187, 40 Pac. 329, 28 L. R. A. 594
(1895).
"People ex rel. McKeever v. Board of Education, 176 Ill. App 491
(1912).
"Roach v. St. Louis Public Schools, 77 Mo. 484; Powell v. Board of
Education, 97 Ill. 375, 37 Am. Rep. 123 (1881); Board of Education v.
Welch, 51 Kan. 792, 33 Pac. 654 (1893).
1State ex rel. Andrew v. Weber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N. E. 708, 58 Am.
Rep. 30 (1886); BeNlmeyer v. Independent Dist., 44 Iowa 564 (1876);
Epley v. Hall, 97 Kan. 594, 155 Pac. 1083, Am. Cas. 1918 D. 151 (1918).
13Associated Schools v. School Dist. No. 83, 122 Minn. 254, 142 N.
.W. 325, 47 L. R. A. N. S. 200 (1913).
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ported by eager believers in the American public school system.
These cases are Meyer v. Nebraska 4 dealing with the Nebraska
statute forbidding the teaching of a foreign language in public
or private schools, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters'5 requiring
all children to attend the public schools. An examination of
these cases will show that the power ofl the state to control the
curriculum of a public school is left unimpaired.
In Nebraska Distict, etc. v. McKelvie,16 the statute provided
that no person, individually or as a teacher, shall in any private,
denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject
to any person in any language other than the English language,
and that languages other than English may be taught as
languages only after a pupil shall have attained and success-
fully passed the eighth grade, as evidenced by a certificate of
graduation issued by the county superintendent. The state
court said that the statute was intended "not only to require
that the education of all children be conducted in the English
language, but that, until they had grown into that language
and until it had become part of them, they should not in the
schools be taught any other language." The state court then
held that the enactment of the law was within the police power
of the state.
The test of this law came before the Supreme Court on ap-
peal in the case of Meyer v. Nebraska,17 where the court readily
admitted the power of the state to require that schools give in-
struction in English but held that the prohibition against the
teaching of a foreign language in the schools was not within the
competency of the state. The statute, it is true, prohibited such
teaching in all schools, public and private. But in the opinion
of Mr. Justice McReynolds, which reversed the conviction of the
defendant for teaching a foreign language in a parochial school,
1 262 U. S. 390, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A. L. R. 1446, (1923) reversing
107 Neb. 657, 187 N. W. 100 (1922).
268 U. S. 510, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 39 A. L. R. 468 (1925).
10104 Neb. 93, 175 N. W. 531, 7 A. L. R. 1633 (1919).
17262 U. S. 390, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A. L. R. 1446 (1923), reversing
107 Neb. 657, 187 N. W. 100 (1922). See also Bartels v. Iowa, reversing
191 Iowa 1061, 181 N. W. 508 (1921). Bohning v. Ohio, reversing 102
Ohio St. 474, 132 N. E. 20, (1921); and Nebraska District, etc. v. Me.
Kelvie, reversing 100 Neb. 448, 187 N. W. 927 (1922), all of these cases
being reported in the Supreme Court in 262 U. S. 404, 67 L. Ed. 1047
(1923).
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occurs this phrase: "Nor has challenge been made of the state's
power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it sup-
ports." The absence of such a challenge indicated that the
state can do in the public schools what the Supreme Court has
held to be beyond its power as to private schools, namely, that
it can require that in the public schools not only must all sub-
jects be taught in English but also that no foreign language
shall be taught in the public schools until the pupil shall have
passed the eighth grade.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters1 the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional an act of the State of Oregon requiring all
children between the ages of eight and sixteen years to attend
the public schools. But the court is again careful to point out
what is not decided. "No question is raised concerning the
power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect)
supervise, and examine them, their teachers, and pupils: to
require that all children of proper age attend some school, that
teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposi-
tion, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship
must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly
inimical to the public welfare." The scope of the opinion is
limited to a declaration that the state cannot "standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teach-
ers only." The decision does not impair the broad powers of
control over public school curriculum but merely holds that all
children cannot be subjected to that curriculum.
II. PARENTAL ComrL.
We return therefore to the blanket proposition that the
determination of the public school curriculum is within the
power of the state. Are there any limits to this power? After
the state legislature has acted or the state board of education or
the local board as the case may be, is there any objection that
can be made to the curriculum thus established for the public
schools which would call for a judicial review?
There are two main arguments that have been advanced,
which we consider in turn. (1) That! the right of the parent
to control the education of the child has been illegally impaired;
'268 U. S. 510, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 39 L. R. A. 468 (1925).
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(2) that the curriculum prescribed violates a constitutional pro-
vision, usually one relating to freedom of worship or the teach-
ing of religion.
The great objection to the unlimited powers of the state over
the education of the child has come from parents. As to the
selection of courses, there are well considered cases that hold
that the parent has no right to pick a course for his child but
such course can be laid down by the state or local authorities
without providing any room for election or choice by pupil or
parent.19 On the other hand, there is authority for the proposi-
tion that the parent has the right to make reasonable selections of
courses.20  On which side rests the weight of logic and of the
felt but unrecognized consideration of expediency ?
The case of School Board District No. 18 v. Thompson 21
presents the issue. The Constitution of Oklahoma provided that
the supervision of instruction in the public schools shall be vested
in a board of education and that the legislature should provide
a uniform system of text books for the schools. The parent
objected to his child taking lessons in singing which were part
of the prescribed. course. The court said: "To our mind the
right of the board of education to prescribe the course of study
and designate the text-books to be used does not carry with it
the absolute power to require the pupils to study all of the
branches prescribed in the course, in opposition to the parents'
reasonable wishes in relation to some of them."
It then rests for support upon a series of three cases, from
which the following excerpts ate taken as indicating how little
the .learned judges knew about modern methods of education.
In Morrow v. Wood 22 the court said: "It is unreasonable to sup-
pose any scholar who attends school can or will study all the
1"9State v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N. E. 708, 58 Am. Rep. 30 (1886).
Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N. H. 473 (1879); Board of Education of Sycamore
v. State, 80 Ohio St. 133, 88 N. E. 412 (1909); Donahoe v. Richards, 38
Me. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 256 (1854).
"State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N. W. 1039, 50
L. R. A, N. S. 268 (1914); School Board District No. 18 v. Thompson,
24 Okla. 1, 103 Pac. 578, 24 L. R. A. N. S. 221 (1909); Sheibley v. School
District No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N. W. 393 (1891); Morrow v. Wood, 35
Wis. 59, 17 Am. Rep. 471 (1874); School Trustees v. People, 87 Ill. 303,
29 Am. Rep. 55 (1877); Bulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567 (1875); Sewell v.
Defiance Union School Board of Education, 29 Ohio St. 89 (1876).
224 Okla. 1, 103 Pac. 578, 24 L. R. A. N. S. 221 (1909).
2135 Wis. 59, 17 Am. Rep. 471, (1874).
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branches taught in them. From the nature of the case some
choice must be made and some discretion be exercised as to the
studies which the different pupils shall pursue. The parent is
quite as likely to make a wise and judicious selection as the
teacher."
In Sheibley v. School District No. 123 the court said: "There
is no good reason why the failure of one or more pupils to study
one or more prescribed branches should result disastrously to
the proper discipline, efficiency, and well-being of the school.
Such pupils are not idle, but merely devoting their attention to
other branches; and so long as the failure of the students, thus
excepted, to study all the branches of the prescribed course, does
not prejudice the equal rights of other student, there is no cause
for complaint."
In School Trustees v. People2 4 the court said: "It is possible
that a father may have very satisfactory reasons for having his
son perfected in certain branches of education to the entire ex-
clusion of others and so long as, in exercising his parental author-
ity in making the selection of the branches he shall pursue, none
others are affected, it can be of no practical concern to those
having the public schools in charge."
In these opinions the learned judges fail to reckon with the
wreckage that such parental selections would make of discipline
and the orderly development of common school courses. Even
where some electives are permitted by the school authorities,
this fact does not authorize the court to widen the field of elec-
tives to include courses designated as "required" by the educa-
tors who worked out the course. In spite of the rather solemn
judicial warnings that we are perhaps approaching the theory
of state control over children set forth in Plato's Republic, it is
perhaps better to restrict parental control over the choice of
studies and compel the child to profit by the selections made by
the educational experts on behalf of the state. It is barely pos,
sible that, in spite of judicial opinion to the contrary, the teacher
may know what the best interests of a child may require far
better than the most devoted parent.
31 Neb. 552, 48 N. W. 393 (1891).
"87 IlM. 303, 29 Am. Rep. 55 (1877).
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The true rule has been laid down in State ex rel. Andrew
v. Webber,25 where a parent brought suit for a writ of manda-
mus to compel the school authorities to revoke a suspension pro-
nounced on his son because of his failure to take music as re-
quired by the school authorities. The son refused because his
father directed him to do so, the father believing that it was not
for tie best interests of the son to take the musical studies. In
sustaining a demurrer to the relator's petition, the court said:
"The important question arises, which would govern the public
high school of the city of Laporte, as to the branches of learning
to be taught and the course of instruction therein, the school
trustees of such city, to whom the law has confided the direction
of these matters, or the mere arbitrary will of the relator, with-
out cause or reason in its support? We are of opinion that only
one answer can be or ought to be given to this question; the
arbitrary wishes of the relator in the premises, must yield and
be subordinated to the governing authorities of the school city of
Laporte, and their reasonable rules and regulations for the
government of the pupils of this high school."
Yet there can be no quick or complete dismissal of the
parent's claims to control the education of the child. It was
the recognition of the right of parents to direct the education
of their children that explains the decision of the Supreme Court
in nullifying the Oregon statute requiring all children between
the ages of eight and sixteen years to attend the public schools.
26
Mr. Justice McReynolds wrote: "We think it entirely plain that
the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of par-
ents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out,
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by
legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the state. The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes
any general power of the state to standardize its children by forc-
ing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him
"108 Ind. 31, 58 Am. Rep. 30 (1886).
2'Perce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 39 A. L.
R. 468 (1925).
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and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Likewise, in deciding the Nebraska case concerning the
teaching of foreign languages 27 the learned justice said: "Cor-
responding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the
parent to give his children education suitable to their station in
life ........ Mere knowledge of the German language can-
not reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been
commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in
error taught this language -in school as part of his occupation.
His right thus to teach and the right of parent to engage him so
to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the
Amendment. Evidently the legislature has attempted materi-
ally to interfere with the calling of modern-language teachers,
with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with
the power of parents to control the education of their own."
While neither of these cases related to the curriculum in the
public school, it is easy to see that the same convictions as to
parental control might lead the judges to uphold the right of a
parent to interfere with the public school curriculum. Or it
might be a sufficient answer to judicial fears as to; standardized
children and official guardians to point out that the parent can
always take his child out of the public school and send him to
a private school where the curriculum more nearly approaches
the parental ideal. It is submitted that this course will safe-
guard the parent's right of control which is largely the heritage
of days when there were no public schools and at the same time
save from embarrassment and interference the state's plans for
the education of all the children whose parents submit them to
the curriculum of the public schools.
It has been assumed that these state-prescribed courses for
the public schools are educationally and scientifically sound.
Occasionally they may not be. Acts may be passed, for example,
which prohibit the teaching of evolution in the public schools or
in any of the universities or normal schools which are supported
by state funds, and such acts, if enforced, may limit or prevent
effective instruction in certain sciences. Such an act, passed by
the legislature of the State of Tennessee in 1925 has been held
"uMeyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A. L. R. 1446
(1923).
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to be constitutional in Scopes v. State of Tennessee,28 a case in-
volving the prosecution of a public school teacher for violating
the terms of the act. Bills of substantially the same tenor as
the Tennessee law were introduced on January 13, 1927 in the
legislature of Arkansas and of Alabama. In 1926, anti-evolution
laws were introduced and withdrawn in Virginia, defeated in
Kentucky, passed by the house and postponed by the senate in
Louisiana, and passed and signed by the governor in Miss-
issippi.29 If these and similar proposals should, wisely or un-
wisely, be enacted into law, would the parents have any right to
object? If the course in biology were entirely omitted, could
the parents object? Would these courts which have sustained
the parent's right to object to the inclusion of singing in the
curriculum sustain his right to object to the exclusion of biology
or the evolutionary theory?
Obviously the courts could not sustain the objections of the
parent. In the Scopes case, the majority opinion remarks: "Our
school authorities are quite free to determine how they shall act
in this state of the law ........ This course of study
(biology) may be entirely omitted from the curriculum of our
schools." Indeed it may be, and the parent would be powerless
to prevent the omission. The parent cannot control the legis-
lative prescription of the public school curriculum by exclusion
or by inclusion. Whether the state legislature or the state board
or local boards decide wisely or unwisely as to the curriculum,
the parent must either accept this legislative decree or withdraw
his children from the public schools until such time as wiser
legislators or sounder educators are chosen to control the curri-
culum of the public schools. The remedy is political, not judi-
cial.
III. REGIONs L~rB y.
The second argument usually advanced against the curri-
culum prescribed by the legislature or the educational board
acting as its agent is that in some way the course violates a con-
stitutional provision concerning freedom of worship or the pro-
hibition against the giving of sectarian instruction. Nearly
every state constitution contains a clause similar to the provis.
11289 S. W. 363 (Tenn.) (1927).
2See summary in Christian Century Vol. 44, page 100, issue of Jan-
uary 27, 1927.
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ion in the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, guaran-
teeing religious liberty.30  Many states prohibit sectarian in-
struction; others prohibit the expenditure of money in support
of places of worship or for any sectarian purpose. 31 The
legislature or the school board cannot in the guise of prescribing
a curriculum violate any of these provisions, but unfortunately
the courts have not always agreed on what constitutes such an
infringement of the constitutional guarantees.
It should be noted first that religious liberty does not in-
clude the right to compel school boards to prescribe religious
exercises. If the board therefore decides to limit or prohibit
exercises in the public schools of a religious nature, such as the
reading of the Bible, such restrictive regulations are valid. In
the absence of legislative action enjoining or requiring religious
instruction in the public schools, the courts have no power to
determine what branches of learning must be taught or what
the curriculum shall be, and therefore the action of a school
board in prohibiting the reading of the Bible in the schools must
be sustained.
32
But on the other hand a school board, while it can forbid
religions exercises, cannot compel such exercises as the courts
"fllinois, Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 3, guaranteeing "the free exer-
cise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship; Maine, Consti-
tution, Art. 1, See. 3, "No one shall be hurt, molested or restrained in his
person, liberty or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season
most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience nor for his reli-
gious professions or sentiments." Kansas Bill of Rights, Sec. 7, "The
right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience shall never
be infringed." "Nor shall any person be compelled to attend or support
any form of worship, nor shall any control of or interference with the
rights of conscience be permitted."
"1 Louisiana, Constitution, Sec. 53, "No money shall ever be taken
from the public treasury directly or indirectly, in aid of any church,
sect, or denomination of religion." Kentucky, Constitution, Sec. 189,
"No portion of any fund or tax . . . for educational purposes, shall
be appropriated to or used by or in aid of any church, sectarian or de-
nominational schools." New York, Constitution, Art. 9, Sec. 4, "Neither
the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or credit or
any public money in aid or maintenance . . . of any school . .
In which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught."
Illinois, Constitution, Article 8, Sec. 3, prohibits the appropriation
of any public fund in aid of any 'sectarian purpose;" Pennsylvania,
Constitution, Art 10, Sec. 2, "No moneys received for the support of the
public schools of the commonwealth shall be appropriated to or used
for the support of any sectarian school."
'Board of Education, v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 13 Am. Rep. 233
(1872).
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have declared to be unconstitutional. What are they? The
great dispute here has centered on the reading of the Bible in
the schools. But for provisions usually contained in the statute
or rule making attendance at the Bible reading optional and not
compulsory, nearly all these regulations would have been nulli-
fied on one or more of the constitutional grounds heretofore
stated. But where the rule has not compelled attendance at the
Bible reading, it has frequently been held that such reading
does not constitute sectarian instruction 3 nor any restriction
on the civil rights and religious liberties of those students who
do not care to attend.3 4  Nor does the reading of the Bible make
the school building a place of worship in violation of a constitu-
tional provision prohibiting such use of school property.3 6 The
placing of the King James Version of the Bible in the school
library does not violate the provisions of a statute providing
that no publication of a sectarian, partisan or denominational
character shall be made part of a school library.3 6
In spite of the friendly tone of these opinions favorable to
Bible reading in the public schools, we must not ignore the
frequently expressed limitation that attendance on such read-
ings must not be made compulsory. 37 It has been held that
if the reading is in school hours, that fact alone is enough to
prove that attendance is compelled, for within school hours the
13Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 69 L. R.
A. 592, 117 Am. St. Rep. 599, 87 S. W. 792 (1905); Donahoe v. Richards,
38 Die. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 256 (1854). In Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 353,
91 N. W. 846 (1902); 65 Neb. 876, 93 N. W. 169 (1903), it was held that
the morning exercises as conducted by the teacher constituted "sectar-
ian instruction," but that the mere reading of the Bible would not be
sectarian instruction if it were read as "mere literature."
'1 Wilkerson v. Rome, 52 Ga. 762, 110 S. E. 895, 20 A. L. R. 1334
(1922); Billard v. Board of Education, 69 Kan. 53, 76 Pac. 442, 66 L. R.
A. 166, (1904); Spiller v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 12 Allen (Mass.) 127
(1866). Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, 120 Ky. 608, 87
S. W. 792 (1905).
"Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N. W. 475, 52 Am. Rep. 444
(1884); Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109 S. W. 115, 16 L. R. A. N. S.
860 (1908). Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, 120 Ky. 608,
87 S. W. 792 (1905).
"Evans v. Selma Union High School District, 193 Cal. 54, 222 Pac.
801, 31 A. L. R. 112 (1924).
* Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109 S. W. 115, 16 L. R. A. N. S. 860,
(1908); Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, 120 Ky. 608, 87
S. W. 792, (1905).
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teacher's wish has the effect of a command. 38  'Where it is
established that the Bible reading is a part of the regular exer-
cises of the public school which the pupils are expected to attend,
several c6urts have pronounced this requirement unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it violates the constitutional right to
the free exercise of religions worship, 39 or on the ground that
it amounts to sectarian instruction or violates the provisions
against the use of public money or public buildings for sectarian
purposes. 40 Nor does it seem likely that provisions by which
children of objecting parents might be excused from attendance
at the Bible reading would affect the course of these decisions,
where the reading was part of the regular schedule of the
school.
41
In a few cases, the reading of the Bible has been part of
the prescribed course in reading rather than part of the opening
exercises of worship. Can the Bible be made a text in the course
in literature without impairing the religious liberties of the
children or violating provisions forbidding sectarian institution?
In the early Maine case of Donahoe v. Richards 42 the court heid
that it was within the power of a school committee to select the
Bible as a reading book, and said: "The Bible was used merely
as a book in which instruction in reading was given. But read-
ing the Bible is no more an interference with religious belief than
would reading the mythology of GreecQ or Rome be regarded as
1State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 876, 93 N. W. 169, 59 L.
R. A. 932 (1903).
10 People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill 334, 92 N. E.
251, 29 L. R. A. N. S. 442 (1910); State ex rel Freeman v. Scheve, 65
Neb. 853, 91 N. W. 846 (1902), motion for rehearing overuled in 65 Neb.
876, 93 N. W. 169, 59 L. R. A. 932 (1903).
, People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, supra; Herold v. Parish
Board, 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116, L. R. A. 1915 D 941 (1915); State ex rel.
Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 44 N. W. 967, 20 Am. St. Rep. 41, 7
L. R. A. 330 (1890).
41 In People ex reL Ring v. Board of Education, supra, the children
were required to remain quiet during the exercises, to fold their hands
und bow their heads, but it was not alleged that they were required to
participate in the Lord's Prayer or the singing of hymns. In State ex
rel. Weiss v. District Board, supra, the children were not required to
remain in school during the reading of the Bible. In Herold v. Parish
Board, supra, the court, referring to the argument that teachers might
with propriety excuse from attendance the children of objecting parents,
said that it amounted to "an admission of discrimination" against such
children.
0 38 Maine 279, 61 Am. Dec. 256 (1854).
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interfering with religious belief or an affirmance of the pagan
creeds. A chapter in the Koran might be read, yet it would not
be an affirmation of the truth of Mohammedanism, or an interfer-
ference with religious faith. The Bible was used merely as a
reading book, and for the information contained in it, as the
Koran might be, and not for religious instruction. No one was
required to believe or punished for disbelief, either in its inspira-
tion or want of inspiration, in the fidelity of the translation or its
inaccuracy, or in any set of doctrines deducible or not deducible
therefrom."
Likewise in State ex rel. Freeman v. SCheve43 the court,
after holding that the Bible reading constituted religious worship
in violation of the state constitution, proceeded to point out that
the Bible might be read as a work of literature as any other
notable book might be. The court said: "Certainly the Iliad
may be read in the schools without inculcating a belief in the
Olympic divinities, and the Koran may be read without teaching
the Moslem faith. Why may not the Bible also be read without
indoctrinating children in the creed or dogma of any sect? Its
contents are largely historical and moral. Its language is un-
equaled in purity and elegance. Its style has never been sur-
passed. Among the classics of our literature it stands pre-
eminant."
A somewhat similar problem was presented in Pfeiffer v.
Board of Education 44 where the court held that a book entitled
"Reading from the Bible" might be used as a supplemented text
book, because it merely affirmed the moral obligations laid down
in the Ten Commandments and the reading of it was not com-
pulsory. But this decision merely points out the possibility of
selecting passages from the Bible the reading or study of which
would not involve constitutional problems of religious liberty or
sectarian instruction, a proposition that can scarcely be open
to question.
But can the Bible be used as the text book even in a course
in literature, as has been decided in Donahue v. Richard, supra,
and suggested in dicta in State ex rel Freeman v. Scheve, supra?
The argument against such a use of the Bible as a reading text
43 65 Neb. 876, 93 N. W. 169, 59 L. R. A. 932 (1903).
"118 Mich. 560, 77 N. W. 250, 42 L. R. A. 536 (1898).
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is thus stated in State ex rel Weiss v. District Boards 45 "That
the reading from the Bible in the schools, altho unaccompanied
by any comment on the part of the teacher, is 'instruction,'
seems to us too clear for argument. Some of the most valuable
instruction a person can receive may be derived from reading
alone, without any extrinsic aid by way of comment or exposi-
tion. The question, therefore, seems to narrow down to this:
Is the reading of the Bible in the schools, not merely selected
passage therefrom, but the whole of it-sectarian instruction of
the pupils? In view of the fact already mentioned, that the
Bible contains numerous doctrinal passages, upon some of which
the peculiar creed of almost every religious sect is based, and
that such passages may reasonably be understood to inculcate
the doctrines predicated upon them, an affirmative answer to
the question seems unavoidable. Any pupil of ordinary intelli-
gence who listens to the reading of the doctrinal portions of the
Bible will be more or less instructed thereby in the doctrines of
the divinity of Jesus Christ, the eternal punishment of the
wicked, the authority of the priesthood, the binding forces and
efficacy of the sacraments, and many other conflicting sectarian
doctrines."
The court carefully points out that this reasoning would
not apply to such text books as are founded upon the funda-
mental moral precepts of the Bible or contain extracts of a non-
sectarian character, from the Scriptures. But the Bible as a
whole, the court concludes, cannot be used as a text book with-
out violating the constitutional provisions against sectrian
instruction.
Where the rule or the practice goes beyond the mere reading
of the Bible, as when the pupils are examined upon the histori-
cal, biographical, narrative and literary features of the Bible,
this clearly makes the Bible a textbook. In State ex rel. Dearle
v. Frazier40 the court held that such examinations, even when
the preparatory work of Bible study was done outside the school,
violated the constitutional provision against applying money to
any religious exercise or instruction.
It is perhaps sufficient to say in regard to the use of the
Bible as a text book in reading a court of law should
,576 Wis. 177, 44 N. W. 967, 7 L. R. A. 330, 20 Am. St. Rep. 41 (1890).
"102 Wash. 369, 173 Pac. 35, L. R. A. 1918F-1056 (1918).
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probably find that such a use constituted sectarian instruction
unless a careful selection of non-controversial Bible passages was
made and the reading limited to such passages. In subjects
other than reading or literature, it is not to be expected that the
Bible would be required as a text, as it does not purport to be a
book of science but a book of religion. But in view of the num-
ber of Anti-Evolution Acts which have been presented to state
legislatures, it is perhaps not beyond the realm of the possible
that at least certain passages of the Bible may be prescribed as
part of the text or the basis of instruction in biology or other
natural sciences. Can this be done? And if it cannot be done,
can the legislature prohibit the teaching of any theory that con-
tradicts the Bible?
In 1925, the legislature of Tennessee passed an act provid-
ing that "it shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the uni-
versities, normals and all other public schools of the state which
are supported in whole or in part by the public school funds of
the state, to teach any theory that denies the story of Divine
Creation of man as taught in the Bible and to teach instead that
man has descended from a lower order of animals. "47 It might
seem that the judicial determination of the validity of this act
would involve the answer to the questions we have just raised.
But in Scopes v. State of Tennessee48 the case was presented to
the court on the theory that the Act merely prohibited the teach-
ing that man has descended from a lower order of animals, and
that the teaching of any theory which denied the story of the
Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible would not con-
stitute an offense unless the teacher taught instead that man
has descended from a lower order of animals. 49 At page 63,
the brief for the state says: "The act prohibits nothing except
the teaching in our public schools and institutions of learning
'that man has descended from a lower order of animals.' No
religion in the history of the world has ever held or taught any
such tenet, precept or doctrine."
In an: effort to give some effect to the clause forbidding the
teaching of any theory that denies the story of Divine Creation
as taught in the Bible, and thereafter to argue that the statute
4, Capter 27 of the Public Acts of Tennessee for 1925.
48289 S. W. 363 (Tenn. 1927))
4, State's brief In Scopes case, pp. 7-12.
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was indefinite because of the uncertainty as to what is meant
by such Biblical theory of creation, Thomas F. Malone, a dis-
tinguished Nashville lawyer, filed a brief as amicus curiae in
which he thus criticized the argument for the state.50 "If the
clause of the act be read out of it, it defeats the primary purpose
of the legislature, for it makes possible a sneer at the Bible and
the Divine origin of man, together with the teaching of the
materialistic doctrine of evolution as to everything else,-pro-
vided only the teacher refrains from expressing his views as to
the descent of man from lower animals."
In deciding this issue, the court on appeal adopted the con-
struction urged by the State, and said: 51 "It thus seems plain
that the Legislature in this enactment only intended to forbid
teaching that man descended from a lower order of animals.
The denunciation of any theory denying the Bible story of
creation is restricted by the caption and by the final clause of
section 1." The caption referred to is "An Act prohibiting
the teaching of the evolution theory," and the final clause is "to
teach instead (of the Bible story of creation) that man has de-
scended from a lower order of animals."
The Scopes case thus failed to add anything to the law in
regard to religious teaching in the public schools. It merely
raises the question it was supposed to answer. It suggests the
inquiry whether the legislature can provide that no theory shall
be taught in these schools which denies the story of Divine
Creation of man as taught in the Bible, or any other part of the
Bible, that specifically commends itself to legislative favor. The
unwillingness of the state to support the statute as thus inter-
preted indicates a recognition that such an interpretation of the
statute would mean its overthrow, and the opinion of the court
is a tacit admission of the same fact. "We are not able to see
how the prohibition of teaching the theory that man has de-
scended from a lower order of animals gives preference to any
religious establishment or mode of worship. So far as we know
there is no religious establishment or organized body that has
in its creed or confession of faith any article denying or affirm-
ing such a theory." This statement could obviously not be made,
if the act had been construed as prohibiting the teaching of any
Brief of Mr. Malone, p. 23.
nScopes v. State, 289 S. W. 363, at 364 (Tenn., 1927).
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theory that denies the story of the divine creation of man as
taught in the Bible.
Regardless of the answer that courts may make to the ques-
tion whether the legislature can definitely provide that a public
school teacher must teach certain Biblical theories of science and
assuming for the moment that such a provision would be invalid
as constituting sectarian instruction, it is perhaps not improper
to point out that a legislative prohibition of scientific theories
opposed to the Bible narrative would logically fall under the
same condemnation. If as seems probable, 52 the Bible cannot
be adopted as the text book in reading or geography or astro-
nomy or biology, can the legislature provide that no public
school teacher shall teach any theory that denies the whole or
any part of the Bible? It would seem that such an enactment
if valid, would accomplish by indirection what the legislature is
powerless to do directly. If the Bible cannot be prescribed as
a text, it cannot be prescribed as the standard by which other
texts and instruction shall be measured.
To hold otherwise would be to guarantee religious liberty
against affirmative attacks by legislative bodies and to leave it
unprotected against interference more subtle and dangerous
because it is veiled. "You must teach this Book" and "You
must not teach anything contradicting this Book" are two ways
of accomplishing the same result. If the legislature and school
boards cannot do the one, they cannot do the other. It is there-
fore submitted that legislative prohibition of the teaching of
theories that happen to contradict the Bible and that are for-
bidden on that account constitutes an indirect violation of funda-
mental concepts of religious liberty that safeguard children in
public schools from sectarian instruction.
This conclusion ought not to disturb those who are devout
believers in religious truth. In Board of Education v. Minor5"
Judge Welch makes this profound observation .-- 'United with
government, religion never rises above the merest superstition;
united with religion, government never rises above the merest
despotism; and all history shows us that the more widely and
completely they are separated, the better it is for both." The
State ex reL Deare v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 Pac. 35, L. IL
A. 1918 F 1056 (1918).
z23 Ohio St. 211, 13 Am. Rep. 233 (1872).
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American government was founded on the idea of complete
separation of church and state, and it would be unfortunate if
through misguided zeal, religionists who happen to have a tem-
porary legislative majority should break down that separation
-which has been their own support and protection.
In People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education5 4 Judge Dunn
has restated the true relation of the church and the civil author-
ity. "Religion is taught and should be taught in the churches,
Sunday schools, parochial and other church schools, and religi-
ous meetings. Parents should teach it to their children at home,
where its truths can be most effectively enforced. Religion does
not need an alliance with the state to encourage its growth.
The law does not attempt to enforce Christianity. Christianity
had its beginning and grew under oppression. Where it has de-
pended upon the sword of civil authority for its enforcement,
it has been weakest. Its weapons are moral and spiritual, and
its powers are not dependant upon the force of a majority. It
asks from the civil government only impartial protection, and
concedes to every other sect and religion the same impartial civil
right." Under these principles, legislative support of Biblical
truth would seem to be unnecessary and unwise.
IV. THE RIGHT To AcQuIRE KNOWLEDGE.
But is there not a third objection to legislative enactment
of theories of knowledge or principles of science! Is it not
beyond the power of a state legislature to prescribe the theories
on which any given subject must be taught? Granted that the
legislature may select what fields of truth may be explored by
the children in the public schools, is it not beyond the legislative
power to prescribe how such search for the truth must be con-
ducted, what theories accepted and what theories rejected?
Is it within the power of a legislature to prescribe that no
theory of the physical world shall be taught which contradicts
in any particular the world view of the Bible which has thus
"4245 III. 334, 92 N. E. 251, 29 L. R. A. N. S. 442 (1910).
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been summarized :55 "The flat earth is founded on an underlying
sea, it is stationary, the heavens are like an upturned bowl or
canopy above it, the circumference of this vault rests on pillars;
the sun, moon, and stars move within this firmament of special
purpose to illumine man; there is a sea above the sky, 'the
waters which were above the heavens;' and through the 'win-
dows of heaven' the rain comes down; within the earth is Sheol,
where dwell the shadowy dead; this whole cosmic system is sus-
pended over vacancy; and it was all made in six days, each with
a morning and an evening, a short and measurable time before."
Or, again, is it within the power of a legislature to pre-
scribe that no theory of economics shall be taught which contra-
dicts in any particular the economic theories of Adam Smith, or
that no theory of chemistry or physics shall be taught which
contradicts the best textbook in these respective fields, published
prior to 1900 ? Can the legislature control the teaching of civics
and government by providing (in Republican states) that no
theory be taught that questions the political principles of Alex-
ander Hamilton or (in democratic states) that no theory be
taught that questions the political philosophy of Thomas Jef-
ferson? It is submitted that legislatures and school boards
can choose the subjects to be taught, but have no power to con-
trol the manner in which in every course the eternal principles
of truth are sought. The "liberty" guaranteed by state and
federal constitutions include a liberty to seek and express the
truth.
That liberty is destroyed in the schools where it should be
most zealously guarded if by legislative power certain theories
of truth are enthroned and other theories of truth are pro-
scribed. The point was thus presented in the Scopes case by
0 Harry Emerson Fosdict, "The Modern Use of the Bible," p. 46,
citing as authorities for this description the following:
Psalm, 136:6, 24:1-2, Genesis 7:11.
Job 37:18, Genesis 1:6-8, Isaiah 40:22.
Job 26:11, Psalm 104:3.





Psalm 78:23, Genesis 7:11.
Job 26:7.
Genesis 4h. 1.
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the counsel for the defens6: "The legislature may undoubtedly,
within reasonable bounds, prescribe what sciences shall be taught
in the public schools, but under the Constitution with the solemn
duty resting upon it to foster science, the legislature cannot
prescribe for the public schools courses in biology, geology,
botany or any other science and then deliberately set aside the
fundamental principles of these sciences and set up theories of
its own." 50
Justice McReynolds has stated, in -the opinion deciding the
case of Meyer v. Nlebraska57 that the phrase "liberty" in the
fourteenth amendmenit includes "not merely freecdom from
bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren, to worship God according to the dictates of his own con-
science, and generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men." (Italics ours.) It does include the right to
acquire useful knowledge, and that right is seriously impaired
if the legislature has the power to control the search for knowl-
edge by ruling out from the start certain theorics of science or
philosophy which have met its displeasure.
Mr. Justice Holmes who dissented in the Meyer v. Nebraska
case and with whom Mr. Justice Sutherland concurred, held
that men might reasonably differ whether a statute prohibiting
the teaching of a foreign language to children might not be a
proper method of reaching the desired result of a commonwealth
in which all the citizens should speak a common tongue, and he
therefore held that the State of Nebraska ought to be allowel
to make this experiment. His criterion for determining how
much a teacher might be forbidden to teach is5s "whether, con-
sidering the end in view, the statute passes the bounds of reason
and assumes the character of a mere arbitrary fiat." This
criterion; on its face, makes no distinction between the public
school teacher and the private school teacher, but must be con-
sidered in the light of the individual whose case was before the
court, a teacher in a parochial school. This view of Mr. Justice
10 Page 59 of brief for defendant Scopes.
57 262 U. S. 398, 67 L. Ed. 1045 (1923).
13262 U. S. 390 at page 412.
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Holmes would, if adopted by the court, apparently safeguard
the liberties of private school teachers and students from the
arbitrary determination of legislatures that certain subjects or
theories shall not be taught. But in the public schools, the
courses and the theories might still apparently be restricted as
far as the legislature cares to go.
It may be, however, that the learned justice did not intend
thus to limit his statement. Perhaps he meant that the criterion
for any legislative control over education, public or private, is
"whether, considering the end in view, the statute passes the
bounds of reason and assumes the character of a mere arbitrary
fiat." If this phrase becomes a living power by which legisla-
tive interference with public school courses is checked by the
courts whenever the freedom of the search for truth is impaired
then the public schools will retain their proud position of leader-
ship in the educational world. But if efforts to control the
theories on which the subject matter of a course is to be pre-
sented should be regarded merely as matters of legislative dis-
cretion, then the public school cirriculum may become the foot-
ball for all the groups in the commonwealth who have special
theories to espouse or to hate. The purity of their motives will
not excuse these zealous advocates who would wreck the teach-
ing of arts, literature and the sciences by placing arbitrary
restrictions around the common enterprise of student and
teacher to find the truth, whatever that truth may be, and
wherever it may lead. The legislature when it attempts to
dictate theories of truth even for a public school curriculum is
not merely abusing its discretion; it is exceeding its power. For
no enforced rejection of a theory can be other than "an arbitrary
fiat" when applied to the right of every child to acquire knowl-
edge and find the truth. CHARLEs J. TuRcx.
University of Kentucky
College of Law.
